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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-4375 
 ___________ 
 
 MICHAEL JOHN PISKANIN, JR., 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 11-cr-00661) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 9, 2012 
 Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH AND CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 







 Michael J. Piskanin, Jr., a Pennsylvania state inmate, commenced this pro se 
action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by 
filing a “Petition/Application for Removal of State Court Prosecution.”  Piskanin 
claimed, as he has in many previous actions, that he is a “federal law enforcement 
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operative-contractor,” and that he is entitled to protection from numerous public officials 
who have allegedly engaged in retaliatory acts, including his own criminal prosecution.  
Piskanin asked the District Court to remove his state criminal proceedings to federal 
court and seeks relief under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1442, and 28 U.S.C. § 1446. 
 In Piskanin’s previous actions, including those in which he attempted to remove 
proceedings to federal court, the government has disputed that he was a federal officer or 
agent or that he was acting under any office or agency of the United States.  In this case, 
the District Court determined—again—that Piskanin failed to show that he was a federal 
officer acting under color of the United States, and thus did not advance any authority 
that would permit the court to grant him any relief.  Piskanin filed a motion for 
reconsideration; the District Court determined that Piskanin had not met the standard for 
reconsideration, and denied the motion. 
 Piskanin filed a timely notice of appeal.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Piskanin’s claim that he is entitled to removal is meritless.  Section 
1442(a)(1) provides that a federal officer may remove to federal court any action brought 
against him in state court for official conduct.  See Feidt v. Owens Corning Fiberglas 
Corp., 153 F.3d 124, 127 (3d Cir. 1998).   To remove under § 1442(a)(1), a defendant 
must establish, among other things, that “the plaintiff’s claims are based upon the 
defendant’s conduct ‘acting under’ a federal office” and that “there is a causal nexus 
between the claims and the conduct performed under color of a federal office.”  Id.  
Piskanin’s conspiratorial allegations about official retaliation against him cannot support 
§ 1442(a)(1) removal.  Moreover, to the extent his removal petition was based on § 
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1446(c)(1), it was plainly untimely.  Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed 
the petition. 
 In his motion for reconsideration, Piskanin reiterated his allegations and requests 
for relief.  He failed to present any argument or evidence that would meet one of the 
criteria for reconsideration, as found in Max’s Seafood Café by Lou Ann, Inc. v. 
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).  Therefore, the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying the motion.  See id. at 673. 
   Because we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
